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Abstract 
Botswana is suffering from one of the worst HIV/AIDS outbreaks in the 
world and the entire society and several stakeholders play a role in the 
containment of this pandemic. 
This dissertation aims at turning the focus to the governance aspects of 
the disease and to examine how different stakeholders in the Botswana 
society adhere to their responsibilities with reference to policy, resources 
and implementation. There is not a single right answer to where the 
weaknesses and strengths of the governance lie, though clear indications 
suggest that specific areas need to, and could, be improved.    
Our findings implicate that in the fight against HIV/AIDS a more 
forceful governance and response is needed. The Botswana policy on 
HIV/AIDS needs to be clearer and more effectively implemented, 
preferably through legislation. The human resource endowment needs to be 
significantly prioritized and strengthened to ensure that the financial 
resources, which are directed towards containing the pandemic, are put to 
good use.  
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1.  Introduction 
1.1 Point of departure 
 The UNAIDS map of the world shows the prevalence rate of HIV/AIDS 
infection in different shades of red. Selebi-Phikwe, where Botswana’s first 
case of HIV/AIDS infection was discovered, is red as blood. So is the rest 
of Botswana, along with many of its neighbouring countries in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. By any measurements, the country must be considered to be struck 
down by a humanitarian catastrophe, literally affecting all areas of society. 
President Festus Mogae expressed the totality of the HIV/AIDS pandemic 
and the urgency to act when he stated:  
 
“As a nation, we have relied on financial discipline, prudent economic 
management and frugality to prosper. These are irrelevant as far as HIV/AIDS 
is concerned. HIV/AIDS is reversing the many gains we have made in social 
and economic development. Since the first AIDS case was reported some 16 
years ago, the human toll has been staggering. AIDS is a tragedy experienced 
by almost every family and community as well as the nation at large. One is 
either infected or affected.” (Foreword to ACHAP-folder)  
 
Containing this pandemic has so far proven difficult and many efforts 
have been made to find out whether there is a societal remedy for this 
incurable disease. There is no simple answer to the question why Africa in 
general, and Botswana in particular, has not been able to contain the spread 
of HIV/AIDS. The lack of easy solutions is due to the fact that HIV/AIDS 
is not only a disease and a personal tragedy, it is not only a pandemic, and it 
is not only an economical and political issue; it is all at once and even more. 
Any phenomena of such large proportions need to be dealt with, no 
matter how overwhelming and out of control the situations seems. This 
means that the issue at hand must be governed. Since there is no definite 
way to govern, governance must always be readdressed and evaluated to 
ensure progress and development. It is this question of governance that will 
be examined on the following pages.   
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1.2 Research questions  
Earlier research has mainly focused on the cultural determinants of the 
pandemic. These certainly play an important role in the Botswana society. 
However, the answers can be found in other areas as well. Botswana is a 
seemingly well-developed middle income country, but in the context of the 
HIV/AIDS situation one cannot help asking the question: Why is HIV/AIDS 
still such an unmanageable problem in a country which in many other 
respects is well-governed? The governance of this issue is a less studied and 
should be highlighted and developed.  
We take the standpoint that to some degree the challenges of the 
containment of HIV/AIDS can be explained by examining how it is 
governed. So we pose the question; wherein lies the weaknesses and 
strengths of the Botswana stake holders’ fight against this pandemic?  
Naturally, a study of this kind will unavoidably focus on the weaknesses, 
since these are the elements which need to be improved.  
1.3 Definitions  
It is essential to clearly define the central concepts which will frequently be 
used in this dissertation.  
Governance is here considered to be defined as the way in which 
political will is carried out. It is closely related to steering, but also takes 
into account funds needed to accomplish something and the features of the 
outcome. Governance includes a plan on how to act as well as the means to 
carry it out. The term governance connotes an indication that one or more 
actors are in control of the situation and can change the pace and direction 
of actions taken. The institutions, organisations and individuals involved in 
these actions are the stakeholders. This dissertation’s focus is put on the 
stakeholders: the public sector, the civil society, and the private sector. 
We have chosen to define policy as a written document formulated by 
stakeholders as a response to any given issue. The major Botswana policy 
document is the Botswana Policy on HIV/AIDS formulated in 1998. Since 
this policy for the moment is subject to revision, we have chosen to focus 
on the National Strategic Framework 2003-2009 (NSF), which is a more 
detailed and up to date action plan, which here will be considered to be 
Botswana’s major policy document. The NSF has the characteristics of a 
policy document and we have therefore chosen not to be hindered by the 
titles of the documents.  
Resources, in this context, are defined as both financial assets and human 
capital. By human capital we mean an educated workforce which is able to 
make use of the financial resources and utilise them in a targeted area. We 
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see no conflict in defining resources as both financial and human, because 
especially in this context these two components are inter-related, and it is 
hard to distinguish the effectiveness of one without the other.  
Implementation is here defined as the ability to transform any given 
written statement, for example a policy, into practical measures aimed at 
ensuring that the policy is carried through. Implementing a policy means 
realising it.   
1.4 Theoretical framework 
Our dissertation aims at examining how policy, implementation and 
resources play a role in the governance of the issue of containing the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic. We wish to examine how different stakeholders 
influence and use these three elements and how this, in turn, affects the 
fight against HIV/AIDS.  
This dissertation is founded on a theoretical framework. We choose to 
use a theoretical framework because it enables us to identify important 
elements of governance and to study relationships between these elements. 
We believe that this method is best suited to answer our research questions.  
Frameworks provide means to analyse all types of institutional 
arrangements. They attempt to identify the universal elements that any 
theory relevant to the same kind of phenomena would need to include 
(Ostrom 1999 p 40). Our framework implies that one can understand any 
kind of governance by examining its different elements. These elements are: 
policy, resources and implementation. By doing this it is possible to define 
governance as a complex system of elements which are all interdependent. 
It then becomes possible to distinguish the weakest and the strongest of the 
three, and also to decide where improvements can be made. We have 
borrowed some of our theoretical framework from the Laswellian stages 
approach to the policy process. Laswell’s abstract operationalisation of the 
policy process proved useful to us, since we focus on two of Laswell’s 
stages namely the prescription stage (here referred to as the policy element) 
and the application stage (here referred to as the implementation stage) 
(deLeon 1999 p 20). We have also added the element of resources, with the 
hope that this will provide for a more comprehensive framework and 
analysis.   
This can be considered to be an organizational study which concerns 
itself with the operation of political and administrative organisations and the 
relationship between various structures (Barrett and Fudge 1982 p 6).  It 
also has an evaluative aim, that is to say, we wish to understand and assess 
the outcomes of the process of governance.  
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1.4.1 The elements of the governance process 
A strategy formulated and defined as a policy, is needed to visualize goals 
and to make involved stakeholders aware of what their responsibilities are 
as well as what their roles are going to be in the coming actions. A policy 
document can seem unlikely to have an effect since it is by definition only a 
recommendation without the power that a legally binding document holds to 
employ sanctions when the objectives are not being implemented. A policy 
document however provides an essential first move since it is an articulation 
of political will. The aim is often to reform an existing system, and to 
achieve something that is considered to lead to improvement. Therefore it is 
an underlying assumption that political will, formulated in a policy 
document, is essential for any kind of joint achievement. In the case of the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic in Botswana the national policy and the national 
strategic framework are therefore the articulation of the political will.   
 Perhaps it is bold to say that a policy document is by definition a 
document of abstractness, nonetheless this abstractness holds both 
weaknesses and strengths. The strength lies in the fact that since it is 
supposed to be a general document, it is allowed to formulate the 
underlying values, along with the goals and the means with which to 
achieve these goals. This strength also constitutes a weakness, since the 
abstractness makes it difficult to apply the document directly onto reality. 
 Consideration is also taken regarding what Dunsire calls “the 
implementation gap”, which recognises that policy does not implement 
itself and that attention needs to be focused towards the fact that policy 
making per se does not ensure action, but rather that there are important 
factors that influence the process of turning policy into action (Barrett and 
Fudge 1982 p 9).  
 A clear division between policy and implementation has been made, 
although we are aware of the fact that a clear distinction, between where 
one starts and the other one ends, is difficult to make.  
Implementation of the aforementioned goals constitutes the link in the 
chain of governance which deals with execution. Through implementation, 
the policy and its goals become operational, and the goals should be 
transformed to reality. To bring something from an abstract level to a level 
of reality is of course complicated and must be considered the most difficult 
part of the governance chain. Implementation is the realisation of 
governance and without implementation policy is nothing but a wish to 
achieve something. This chosen approach can be defined as ‘the policy-
makers perspective’, since it represents what policy-makers are trying to do 
to put policy into effect. A weakness of this approach can be that it 
generates a top-down outlook (Barrett and Fudge 1982 p 12). This has not 
been identified as a problem, since the Botswana response in addressing this 
issue has a character of being top-down. In our opinion it is clear that the 
public sector is the primary stakeholder and agent. However, the 
relationship between the involved stakeholders is far from hierarchical and 
  5 
it would be misleading to identify the private sector and the civil society as 
agents in the public policy maker’s service.  
 Resources are essential in political actions of any kind. Resources are 
closely linked to implementation, since it is the combination of these two 
elements that will ensure that the planned actions are taking place. 
Resources are the means without which nothing can be accomplished. 
1.5 Method and material 
When analysing such severe and unique circumstances as the ones which 
HIV/AIDS in Botswana presents, it is important to get close to the object of 
study. Consequently the main method of collecting material for this 
dissertation has been by conducting interviews. A method of interviewing 
allows for an interaction between the informants, and thus the object of 
study, and the persons studying it. The reasons for choosing this method 
were two-fold, firstly interviews are advantageous for studies made on an 
unexplored turf. Also, and most importantly, the reason for our focus on 
informants and interviews was because of a wish to find out the informants 
reflections on the governance of HIV/AIDS. Our primary aim was therefore 
to find out how the stakeholders themselves understood and assessed the 
situation in Botswana at the moment. With this aim using interviewees 
proved the superior way to collect material (Esaiasson, Giljam, Oscarsson, 
Wängerud 2005 p 279ff).  
The interviews have been conducted to allow for an informal 
conversation surrounding the themes that have been at the centre of our 
theoretical framework; policy, resources and implementation. By 
constructing the interviews after our theoretical framework, we fulfilled the 
aim to think thematically, and to constantly readdress the research 
questions, which are requirements one should try to fulfil in an interview 
situation (Esaiasson, Giljam, Oscarsson, Wängerud 2005 p 290). We have 
also, to some extent, used written material. The written sources are 
complementary to our interviews and used in order to paint a 
comprehensive picture of the situation at hand.  
1.6 Limitations  
It is important to thoroughly examine the material at hand in order to be 
able to open-mindedly make conclusions and to ensure intersubjectivity.  
 This dissertation includes several primary sources, which is always 
advantageous. It is still important to scrutinize these sources with the same 
kind of incredulous approach as one would do with other kinds of material. 
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The informant’s answers must be scrutinised both by content and context. 
That is to say, the answers given must be considered to be a consequence of 
the reality of the informant. One must acknowledge that this inevitably will 
restrict the informant’s ability to provide objective answers. It is also 
important to acknowledge that the informant’s subjective truths are not 
always coherent, like empirical scientific facts, but together their answers 
give a comprehensive overview of the situation from which conclusions 
regarding the stakeholders’ opinions of the governance of HIV/AIDS can be 
drawn.  
 The list of interviews is a reflection of our efforts to collect material of 
such diversity that a comprehensive and multifaceted picture of the 
governance of HIV/AIDS in Botswana could be painted. The aim has been 
to gather opinions of the different stakeholders involved, because it is the 
stakeholders that are responsible for the governance of HIV/AIDS, and they 
have experience of the strengths and weaknesses of the system. This aim 
has been achieved, but it must be acknowledged that the selection has been 
limited by certain difficulties due to bureaucratic and time-consuming 
restrictions. For this reason the decision to leave out the local government 
as a stakeholder was made. It proved impossible for them to voice their 
opinions. Naturally, it has not been possible for all stakeholders to voice 
their opinions in this study, which limits the prospects to answer the 
question where the weakest links are. Despite this, our conclusions are 
based on the informants’ answers, and we are convinced that our material 
provides a clear and inclusive picture of the situation and of the challenges 
the governance of HIV/AIDS in Botswana faces. 
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2.  Background 
2.1 A brief review of the political and economical 
development of Botswana 
In 1966 Botswana became independent from Great Britain. The transition to 
independence was peaceful, and this fact has been used to explain the very 
different, and in relation to its neighbouring countries, successful 
development of Botswana. The country has a long democratic tradition, the 
Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) has ruled the country since 
independence and the three presidents have been democratically elected 
(Baxter 2006 p 38f). Transparency International rates Botswana at 37
th 
place 
on the Corruption Perceived Index, with a score of 5. 6. This makes 
Botswana the least corrupt country in Africa (www.transparency.org 2007-
04-20). Inequality between sexes and between rich and poor is still a major 
problem in Botswana and 22 % of the households in this middle income 
country live below the poverty line (NSF 2003-2009 p 17). 
Shortly after independence diamond resources were discovered in 
Botswana, and ever since, the diamond mining has been the main source of 
income. Largely due to the diamonds the economy has been prosperous 
with an average growth of 10 per cent per year throughout the 1990s 
(Baxter 2006 p 18). Cattle farming is also an important industry to a large 
part of the highly mobile but small population of approximately 1.7 million 
people. The economy and the small population are destined to suffer 
severely the coming years due to deaths caused by AIDS, and this will pose 
a threat to the very successful development which Botswana has 
experienced to date (Fried, Telemeddelande 2006). 
2.2 HIV/AIDS in Botswana  
Since the first case of HIV/AIDS was discovered in 1985 the prevalence has 
risen dramatically and Botswana is now, proportionally, the second worst 
affected country in the world with a prevalence of 17. 1 % among the whole 
population aged 18 months or older (BAIS II) and 33. 4 % among active 
people between the ages of 15 and 49 (2005 Botswana Sentinel Survey). 
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The latter figures show a slight decline in incidence
1
 since the last Sentinel 
Survey in 2003.  
The main reasons for the high prevalence rate in Botswana have been 
identified and categorized into four groups; stigma and denial, socio-
cultural determinants, socio-economic determinants and demographic 
mobility. Stigma and denial generates an atmosphere which makes it harder 
to educate the population and makes attempts to curb the spread of 
HIV/AIDS more difficult. Inequality between the sexes, the subordinate 
position of women in sexual relationships as well as in economic situations 
and the tradition of multiple partners are also highly contributing factors. 
The socio-economic factors relate to the fact that poor people are adopting a 
high-risk lifestyle to meet their daily needs, while people with higher 
income have the ability to exploit this inequality. The mobility of the 
Batswana, due to increasing urbanisation and the strong connections to the 
rural villages and cattle posts, is also affecting the prevalence rates in the 
country along with the country’s geographical position as a transport hub 
for southern Africa (National Strategic Framework 2003-2009 p 16).   
2.3 The response to HIV/AIDS in Botswana  
For an overview of the history of HIV/AIDS we have chosen to divide the 
time after the first discovery of HIV/AIDS in Botswana, mainly using 
Heald’s division, into different phases.  
  2.3.1 Phase one: first response 
The first response to the pandemic was quick (the Botswana government 
acted almost ten years ahead of the neighbouring country, South Africa) 
(Heald 2005 p 32) as the first HIV infected person was diagnosed in the 
country in 1985 (Dawn Brochure from MoH 2003 p 5). 
Still, the first phase was not nearly as comprehensive as the following 
ones and its main focus was to impede further spread of HIV/AIDS through 
blood transfusions (Fried Telemeddelande 2006) . 
 
                                                                                                                                               
 
1 Incidence is the measure of the number of new infections. Prevalence, on the other hand, measures the 
total number of people infected at any given time. 
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2.3.2 Phase two: trying to change behaviour 
Foreign agencies were involved early on and strategies, as the National 
Policy on AIDS from 1993, were composed (Fried Telemeddelande 2006) 
as was the Medium Term Plan II from 1997-2002 (MTP II) (Dawn 
Brochure from MoH, 2003 p 5). Financial resources were mainly focused 
on education and the use of condoms was fiercely promoted. HIV/AIDS 
became referred to as “the radio disease” as the message of this disease, that 
few people at this stage had ever heard of and even fewer had seen the 
effects of, was broadcasted over the radio (Heald 2005 p 33f). The 
campaigns for this so far quite invisible disease were not seen as 
trustworthy and people were insulted by the implications. Loud reactions 
came from church groups, parents and elders who considered the campaigns 
to promote promiscuity (Allen, Heald 2004 p 1144f). The policy document 
from 1993 was reviewed and replaced in 1998, and a multi-sectoral 
response was formulated (National Policy on HIV/AIDS 1998). 
2.3.3 Phase three: ARVs and VCT 
In 2000, the Botswana government lead by President Festus Mogae together 
with the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and Merck Pharmaceuticals 
established a public-private partnership; African Comprehensive HIV/AIDS 
Partnership (ACHAP). Because of this Botswana could, as the first country 
in the world, launch a free anti-retroviral (ARV) programme in 2001. The 
ARV programme, called Masa, was piloted in four sites but is now covering 
most parts of the country and provides testing facilities as well as free 
medicines to clients with a CD4 count below 200
2
 (Dawn Brochure from 
Moh 2003 p 6f). To make the programme work, openness and 
encouragement to “know your status” became the main goals through 
Voluntary Counselling and Testing (VCT). The new programme was 
wholly supported by the government, but the ARV treatment required new 
amenities and lots of both human and financial resources. This was supplied 
predominantly by the government, but also by external donors striving to 
meet the new demands (Heald 2005 p 35-36). 
During the third phase efforts to not only educate, but to take control, 
were made. In 1999 the Prevention of Mother to Child Transmission 
(PMTCT) programme was launched. After a slow start the programme has 
enrolled more and more pregnant women (Fried Telemeddelande 2006) . In 
2001 Total Community Mobilization (TCM) launched by the NGO Humana 
People to People started in Botswana. The idea was that “only the people 
                                                                                                                                               
 
2 CD4 T-cells are co-ordinating the immune system of the human body and can be infected and killed by 
the HIV virus. The number 200 refers to the number of CD4 T-cells per cubic millimetre of blood. In a 
healthy body the count should be between 500-1500/mm3 blood (www.aidsmap.com 2007-04-20). 
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can liberate themselves from the epidemic” and field-officers were trained 
to go from door to door to talk and inform about HIV/AIDS. In 2005, when 
the programme was completed, 900 000 people had been covered (Humana 
folder 2005). 
As more actors were involved and new programmes started, coordination 
became a priority. In 2001 the National AIDS Coordinating Agency 
(NACA) was founded to coordinate issues regarding HIV/AIDS 
(Telemeddelande, Mnr GABO/20060227-2). Despite of the numerous 
international actors in the country and the many actions taken, it is the 
Botswana government that takes the lion’s share (79%) of the HIV/AIDS 
related costs (The Weekly Electronic Press Circular of the Office of the 
President 2006-11-26). 
2.3.4 Phase four: introducing routine testing 
Despite the free testing clinics, Tebelopele, which were created to assist the 
Masa programme, it proved difficult to convince people to come and get 
tested. The VCT policy was debated and even though compulsory testing 
was discussed this idea was rejected due to ethical reasons. Instead, routine 
testing was seen as ethically justifiable and as a firmer response to the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic than the existing one. With routine testing all patients 
would be informed that they would be tested for HIV unless they explicitly 
say no (Rennie, Behets 2006 p 53f). In 2003 the National Strategic 
Framework 2003-2009, which followed the MTP II, with a goal of an AIDS 
free generation in 2016, was approved by the government (Fried 
Telemeddelande 2006) . 
The government of Botswana has moved from actions of education and 
surveillance to a much more resolute tactic to get people to test themselves. 
Without test results people have less incentive to protect themselves. Yet, 
national and international human rights organizations loudly state the 
dilemma of the routine testing; people are not always correctly notified 
about the possibility to “opt out”, which is a human right (Heald 2005 s 39-
40).   
   2.4 The stakeholders involved 
A multisectoral approach defines the current response and implies that all 
sectors and levels of government, the civil society, the private sector, the 
media and development partners have a shared responsibility in the fight 
against HIV/AIDS. We have identified the three most important 
stakeholders which are; the government (and the public sector), the private 
sector and the civil society. 
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2.4.1 The government and the public sector 
In this dissertation the public sector is considered to be the most crucial 
institution involved, primarily because the government is the most 
significant stakeholder, since it is the main policy-maker and the law-maker 
with the capacity to tax people and delegate funds towards different 
problems, and decide which issue is most urgently in need of funding. The 
government is responsible for its people and its very foundation is 
threatened because it relies on a healthy workforce to function.  
The structural response towards HIV/AIDS has historically been to treat 
it as merely a health issue, which has meant that the Ministry of Health 
(MoH) has been the sole responsible institution at governmental level. 
When delegation of policy, implementation, supervision and general control 
was not considered sufficient or successful the policy document of 1998 
stated that a multi-sectoral response should define the future effort towards 
containing HIV/AIDS (Botswana National Policy on HIV/AIDS 1998). 
 In 1999 President Mogae declared HIV/AIDS to be a national 
emergency, and in response to this he established the National AIDS 
Council (NAC) which is responsible for the policy-making on all 
HIV/AIDS related issues. It is the highest coordinating body, mandated to 
advise the government on HIV/AIDS matters (ACHAP 2005 p 8). At the 
same time NAC’s secretariat, the National AIDS Co-ordinating Agency 
(NACA), was created. As the name suggests NACA’s role is to be the 
national coordinator of the multi-sectoral response (Watson 2004 p 9). This 
means that NACA has a broad mandate, which includes the formulation and 
review of policy, to facilitate implementation, to mobilise resources and 
strengthen institutional capacity, as well as to co-ordinate, monitor and 
evaluate programmes. NACA currently reports to, and is subordinate to, the 
Office of the President
3
 (ACHAP 2005 p 8).  
The MoH naturally plays a pivotal role, even though the multi-sectoral 
response has meant that its overall responsibility has been taken away. The 
Department of AIDS Prevention and Care (DAPC) in the MoH implements 
prevention programmes, and is responsible for ARV treatment, PMTCT, 
routine HIV testing, other sexually transmitted infections, information, 
education and communication programmes (IEC’s), and home based care 
(ACHAP 2005 p 8).  
For local governments the multi-sectoral response has entailed a 
decentralisation of the response. This has been achieved through the 
creation of District Multi Sectoral AIDS Committees (DMSACs), that have 
the mandate to manage and co-ordinate the district-level response according 
to the unique needs in different districts (NSF 2003-2009 p 37). By ensuring 
a geographical closeness to the population, the DMSACs should also be 
                                                                                                                                               
 
3 This was not the case in the inception of NACA, but in 2000 President Mogae took over the chair of 
NAC from the Minister of Health (Telemeddelande Mnr GABO/20060227-2 p 3). 
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able to model effective HIV/AIDS initiatives according to district-specific 
needs (ACHAP Review 2005 p 26). The DMSACs are also supposed to 
function as a voice of the district level toward the central levels (NSF 2003-
2009 p 37).  
The concept of a multi-sectoral response is intimately linked with the 
concept of mainstreaming, by which it is intended that all actions should be 
in alignment with the NSF
4
.    
2.4.2 The civil society 
One can turn to the civil society for an understanding of this pandemic’s 
consequences on a micro level and for an insight into the role of the civil 
society in the fight against HIV/AIDS.  
The umbrella organisation for NGOs concerned with HIV/AIDS related 
issues is called Botswana Network of AIDS Organisations (BONASO). 
BONASO’s goal is to be the co-ordinator for NGOs concerned with 
HIV/AIDS (www.bonaso.org.bw 2007-05-10).  
 Botswana Network of People Living with HIV and AIDS (BONEPWA+) 
has the conviction that very little can be achieved if the people who are 
already affected are not represented. BONEPWA+ aims to build capacity 
and leadership within support groups. BONEPWA+ covers 8 districts (of 
24) and is represented in NAC (Shrestha 2006-12-04).  
 The Botswana Network on Ethics, Laws and AIDS (BONELA) deals 
primarily with the human rights aspect of HIV/AIDS. They, for instance, 
have organised campaigns concerning the work situation of HIV/AIDS 
infected people, and operates closely with the International Labour 
Organisation. BONELA has also brought up the question whether the rights 
of patients to opt out from routine testing is being respected 
(www.bonela.org 2007-05-10). 
Humana People to People is an NGO which works with education about 
HIV/AIDS and which aims at the population’s ownership of the issue 
through the TCM project (www.humana.org/default.asp 2007-05-10).  
 These are merely a few examples of the different NGOs which deal with 
HIV/AIDS related issues, but are representative of the stakeholders of the 
civil society. 
2.4.3 The private sector 
“It makes business sense to care about HIV/AIDS”, says Wame Jallow, the 
co-ordinator at Botswana Business Coalition on AIDS. This statement 
                                                                                                                                               
 
4 For further reading on the specific sectoral responsibility of each ministry see the NSF. 
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concludes why it is important to look at the private sector as an important 
stakeholder (Jallow 2006-12-14). 
BBCA is a service organisation, which has the aim to build capacity 
within companies to help them deal with the situation that they are faced 
with due to the high rate of HIV/AIDS in the workforce. Even though this 
organisation is a NGO it is the institution which defines the private sector’s 
role in this issue, and that is the reason we regard it as the private sectors 
representative in this matter.   
Its vision is to ensure that every private sector company in Botswana 
develops a policy on HIV/AIDS which is practically implemented. BBCA 
wishes to strengthen the Botswana private sector’s role in managing and 
combating the pandemic in the workplace. It does this by assisting the 
business community with the development of HIV/AIDS work programmes 
and policies, and by supporting the private sector in accessing government 
HIV/AIDS services. BBCA also assists the government by reaching more 
people, thus increasing the uptake level for its services. This organisation 
deals primarily with medium and small sized companies, and its support is 
solely of human resource character (Jallow 2006-12-14). 
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3. Findings 
3.1 Short note on the existence of political will in   
Botswana 
The Botswana government cannot, in comparison to other Sub-Saharan 
countries, be said to have taken the pandemic lightly. The free ARV 
treatment clearly indicates a desire to change the situation as do different 
programmes, such as PMTCT and VCT. In 2003 President Mogae got 
tested and publicly announced the negative result, an action which also 
exemplifies a determination to enlighten the Batswana of the importance to 
get tested (Heald 2005 p 39).  
From our point of view, and from the opinions voiced by various 
informants (Muchiru 2006-12-04, Kerapeletswe 2006-12-05, Khan 2006-
12-18) it is clear that there is no lack of political will which seriously 
incapacitates the response to HIV/AIDS in Botswana. 
3.2 Policy 
Policy formulation is the initiating stage, or the foundation, of the 
governance process. The goals, towards which the actions are aimed, are 
created. The strengths and weaknesses of a policy are due to a variety of 
causes and in this chapter the Botswana stakeholders’ opinions about the 
Botswana policy on HIV/AIDS are displayed.  
3.2.1 The Botswana policy  
Simon Muchiru, a consultant with focus on HIV/AIDS issues, states that the 
Botswana policy on HIV/AIDS is fine, and that it is much better than any of 
the other Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries’ 
policies. When the first policy document was formulated in 1993 it was a 
strong document for its time, he says. This also applied for the current 
policy document, when it was written in 1998 (Muchiru 2006-12-04). The 
former head of NACA, M.D. Banu Khan, concurs with this statement, and 
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says that for implementation purposes the NSF is “quite a good document” 
(Khan 2006-12-18).          
 That said, Muchiru states that there are issues which the documents 
(neither the NSF nor the policy document from 1998) do not cover. He 
gives the example that condoms are not distributed in prisons (because 
homosexuality is illegal), and that there is no law against intra-marital rape. 
According to Muchiru, the reason for this is because the decision-makers 
are not ready to make the changes in the law that would be required. In 
Muchiru’s opinion this makes the policy far from perfect, due to what is 
missing, rather than what it covers (Muchiru 2006-12-04). 
 Mona Drage, Programme Officer at UNAIDS, says that defining the 
HIV/AIDS approach with such a clear emphasis on mainstreaming and 
multi-sectorality can prove to be incapacitating, because it can lead to a 
thinning out of the response, rather than ensuring comprehensiveness. 
Despite this, the idea is a good one, and the NSF reflects this, although it 
should be more sharply formulated (Drage 2006-12-07).  
Charity Kerapeletswe, PhD and Research Fellow at Botswana Institute 
for Development Policy Analysis (BIDPA), is at the moment involved in 
the delayed midterm review of the NSF, with the aim to answer the question 
whether this document is aligned with the issue today. She believes that the 
policy needs overhauling, because the targeted people are not the ones who 
own the issue, due to the fact that it is a top-down policy (Kerapeletswe 
2006-12-05). Even though the NSF was formulated through a very 
consultative process aiming to involve all tiers of society, both traditional 
(for example the kgotla
5
) and modern (for example the DMSACs) (Watson 
2005 p 8f), this interdisciplinary approach was not totally successful, 
because for example nurses were marginalised in respect to the policy 
formulation, and had to accept the top-down, non-participatory character of 
the NSF (Phaladze 2003 p 30).          
Kerapeletswe also claims that little can be done before the issue of 
internalisation is dealt with. She says that because the policies on 
HIV/AIDS have been formulated to address the pandemic as an emergency 
the government has had the ownership of the issue. She says that “if you 
give people ownership, the sky is the limit of how resourceful they can be” 
(Kerapeletswe 2006-12-05). The treatment of HIV/AIDS as a pandemic and 
as a crisis situation has made both the involved stakeholders and civil 
society too dependent on the government in this issue, rendering them less 
useful than they could, and should, be (ibid).  
Jallow says that the NSF is a double-edged sword, vis-à-vis the private 
sector, since it has provided direction for employers who take the matter of 
their own involvement seriously. But still it is her firm opinion there is great 
need for a revision, and she says that if she had been the author she would 
                                                                                                                                               
 
5 Kgotla are traditional village councils, headed by the village chief, where all male inhabitants can 
openly discuss political issues (Leith 2005 p 36). 
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have used a stronger language. The minimum internal packages that 
companies should implement could have been far more inclusive. She 
considers the fact that the private sector and its responsibilities being dealt 
with on only half a page as telling about the limited inclusion of this sector 
(Jallow 2006-12-14).        
Steve Jones, a representative of Bamangwato Concessions Limited 
(BCL), a mining company and the biggest employer in the small mining 
town Selebi-Phikwe, states that one must remember that in Botswana, a 
country the size of France, with a population of 1. 7 million inhabitants, the 
government’s influence and impact diminish as one comes further away 
from the capital. He describes how BCL has been awarded by the 
government for its HIV/AIDS policy in the workplace, but as an employee 
at the company he experiences that this is something to show to the outside, 
and that there is very little actually going on in the workplace (Jones 2006-
11-30).     
3.2.2 The legislative environment (or the lack thereof)  
Drage raises the issue of whether the weakness of the legislative 
environment is negative for the effectiveness of HIV/AIDS programmes. 
There are very few laws passed based on the HIV/AIDS policy, which 
means that it is not as strenuously followed as a law would be (Drage 2006- 
12-07).   
 Jallow gives a somewhat ambiguous reply to the question of whether the 
legislative environment in Botswana in general, and for HIV/AIDS issues in 
particular, needs to be strengthened. She states that legislation could provide 
a platform, because sometimes having a workplace policy on HIV/AIDS 
can be only “window-dressing”, but legislation will inevitably take away 
the good-will which exists in companies towards their employees (Jallow 
2006-12-14).  
 Carolyn Collins, a nurse with years of experience of the health care 
system in Botswana, identifies the lack of legislation as a major reason for 
the government’s problem. She exemplifies this with the fact that there is no 
occupational health legislation, which renders it impossible for the 
government to do what she thinks is needed; to order every industry to “do 
something” on this matter. She is confident that it is through firm legislation 
this issue ought to be governed (Collins 2006-12-05). Nthabiseng Nkwe’, 
advocacy officer at BONELA, agrees with this statement when she says 
that: ”Policy is really hopeless, because it is not binding; it is only a 
document that is meant to guide” (Nthabiseng Nkwe’ 2006-11-27). Khan 
hopes that a new policy document will better enable a foundation for 
legislation on HIV/AIDS in the future (Khan 2006-12-18).  
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3.2.3 Centralised co-ordination – a good formula?  
In response to the pandemic of HIV/AIDS in developing countries the 
United Nations advocates for the “three ones”, which are a national strategic 
framework, a national co-ordination agency, and a system of monitoring 
and evaluation to be set up to facilitate the governance of HIV/AIDS. 
NACA was already established when these goals were formulated at the 
HIV/AIDS and STD (Sexually Transmitted Diseases) conference in Nairobi 
in 2003 (Drage 2006-12-07, www.unaids.org 2006-12-19).  
There is a wide consensus among our interviewees that the theory of a 
nationally co-ordinating body is a very good one (Muchiru 2006-12-04, 
Khan 2006-12-18, Nkwe’ 2006-11-27, Drage 2006-12-07, Collins 2006-12-
05), though there seems also to be an agreement on the fact that this is a 
very difficult task to carry out in reality. To establish a co-ordinating 
agency, which almost everyone should answer to, in a large bureaucracy has 
indeed been a challenge (Drage 2006-12-07, Khan 2006-12-18). Khan 
explains how pressure from development partners and the government, 
eager to see fast results, made it difficult to set up the proper structures and 
build capacity (Khan 2006-12-18). NACA’s mandate is to be the overseer 
and co-ordinator of the implementation, but does not have a mandate to be 
responsible for implementation. This seems to have led to some confusion 
regarding what the actual role of NACA is, or should be (Drage 2006-12-
07). Machiru also believes that the concept of NACA is a good one, but the 
lack of capacity due to too little experience at the top makes NACA 
malfunctioning (Muchiru 2006-12-04). 
3.3 Resources 
No matter how good, or bad for that matter, the policy is considered to be, 
implementation is not possible without resources. Financial resources are 
often seen as the most problematical obstacle to overcome in developing 
countries, but Botswana has economically come a long way and is now 
facing new challenges. 
3.3.1 HIV/AIDS programmes -an expensive necessity  
Since the ARV programmes started in 2002 many concerns have been 
raised regarding the cost of the programme in the long run. The EU 
ambassador to Botswana, Paul Malin, raises the question about economical 
endurance. He considers the high costs of the HIV/AIDS programmes a 
difficult obstacle to overcome and also expresses concern that all funding 
available is not being collected because of NACAs inadequate accounting 
(Malin 2006-11-27).                   
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Joshua Machao, the Information Education and Communications (IEC) 
Officer for the Masa programme, discusses three great challenges to the IEC 
element of the Masa programme and mentions, among them, the capacity 
constraints in the public health sector. Machao also discusses the problem of 
the huge costs of the ARV programme and points out the unsustainability 
when you eventually reach a bottleneck of too many patients and too few 
funds. Improving capacity, within Botswana in general and within the 
Botswana public sector in particular must be prioritized. Even if outsourcing 
could be a good short term option, reliance on foreign expertise is inevitable 
(Machao 2006-11-27).                  
 Tore Steen, with the Botswana National Tuberculosis Program at MoH, 
is also concerned by the fact that medicines are becoming increasingly pricy 
(Steen 2006-11-30). Khan, however, underlines that the medicines are not 
the most costly part of the ARV programme, but the tests needed to 
diagnose and medicate the patients are. She still agrees that the costs, 
unrelated to its origins, may become a problem in the future (Khan 2006-12-
18). Like many others, Thabo Seleke, Research Fellow at the University of 
Botswana, is concerned with the costs and what will happen if external 
donors, like the Bill and Melinda Gates foundation, withdraw their funding. 
He points to the fact that Botswana’s only major income is diamonds, which 
puts the country in a dependent situation, and that the programmes started 
cannot be stopped without dire consequences (Seleke 2006-11-28).    
3.3.2 Human resources 
Drage is concerned over the severe lack of human resources in Botswana. 
She also discusses another type of bottle necks than the ones mentioned by 
Machao, and refers to the bureaucratic system. She says that NACA, for 
example, has difficulties getting money through the system and to the 
different implementers (Drage 2006-12-07).  
 Along with mentioning the intricacy of sustaining such an expensive 
programme as the ARV treatment, Collins concurs with Drage when she 
states that the health sector is nurse driven and that there are not enough 
educated nurses in Botswana. In her view, emphasis must be put on 
educating and making nurses qualified because of the characteristic of the 
Botswana healthcare (Collins 2006-12-07).  
As a doctor, Khan sees practical solutions regarding for example the lack 
of doctors. Since doctors are scarce in Botswana they should not be the ones 
handling the counselling of HIV/AIDS patients. Instead lay counsellors 
could help relieve the burden on doctors (Khan 2006-12-18).  
Muchiru is alarmed that, even though the government has done a lot to 
satisfy the shortage of doctors (for example deciding to build the first 
medical school in the country) the capacity achieved is being lost due to 
HIV/AIDS related deaths. He is also concerned with the fact that at the 
same time as donors are giving money to build capacity, doctors are moving 
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to these more beneficial employers, leaving the country and the public 
sector even worse off. Muchiru is one of many who claim that money is not 
what Botswana needs. The money is there but nobody knows how to use it, 
he says (Muchiru 2006-12-04).  
The resource problem takes on another form, for Seleke. His research in 
Selebi-Phikwe and Francistown showed that the resources at clinics and 
health care facilities are unequally distributed. In Selebi-Phikwe the 
resources are scarcer than in other places, a sign of the government’s less 
serious efforts in some parts of the country (Seleke 2006-11-28). Also 
Jones, working in Selebi-Phikwe mentions that government actions are less 
visible in the rural areas than in the larger urban centres (Jones 2006-11-30). 
This leads to what Seleke calls the “death row phenomena”, when patients 
in some places have to wait sometimes up to six months after diagnosis 
before starting their ARV treatment (Seleke 2006-11-28). The picture is not 
cohesive though as Machao, in contrast, states that there are no waiting lists 
for ARV treatment (Machao 2006-11-27).  
3.3.3 The lack of physical resources  
Prashanda Man Shrestha, United Nations Volunteer-Programme Advisor at 
BONEPWA +, draws attention to the problematic fact that civil society is 
not, nor will ever be, self-sufficient. This is not a problem that is specific to 
Botswana, but the point remains that civil society will always need to rely 
on donors. This means that the programmes submitted should be in 
accordance with the NSF and other donors’ policies, which Shrestha finds 
troublesome since it limits the scope of freedom for action for the civil 
society. Shrestha also explains that when it comes to funding, NGOs have 
immense trouble getting money for administrative and organizational 
purposes, since donors are more eager to support activities and programmes 
than the organisation as a whole. This also entails an additional problem, 
since this makes it difficult to employ people, with for example accounting 
skills, for a longer period of time. This in turn makes reporting, control and 
evaluation hard to achieve (Shrestha 2006-12-04). 
Collins points to one of the severest lack of resources in the fight against 
HIV/AIDS. According to her, the condom distribution has not functioned 
properly despite the fact that the government has chosen to use 
“condomize” as one of the focal points in their campaigns. Condom 
dispensers are often empty and to privately distribute condoms is useless as 
long as the national supply is not regularly refilled. She says that “people 
will use them if they are available”, and that the condom distribution is an 
easy problem to solve, if only the logistical conditions were there (Collins 
2006-12-05). 
Mavis Bengtsson, a nurse employed by the Centre for Disease Control 
draws attention to the fact that Botswana is still a developing country and 
this entails that resources will never be enough. There will always be a need 
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for improvement and advancement. She says that in her work she uses old 
equipment, which would be far from acceptable by Western standards 
(Bengtsson 2007-12-01).  
3.4 Implementation 
It is self-evident that implementation will prove to be the most difficult part 
of governance of an issue of such totality as the HIV/AIDS pandemic. The 
essence of making governance work is that the goals and objectives of a 
policy solution should be made real. This is bound to meet obstacles of 
many kinds on many different levels.  
Implementation has been identified as the weakest element of 
governance by many of the interviewed stakeholders (Bengtsson 2006-12-
01, Collins 2006-12-05, Jones 2006-11-30, Muchiru 2006-12-04, Wester 
2006-12-07), and we have therefore examined what the constraints and 
obstacles are to successful implementation.   
To identify a country’s joint implementation response to the pandemic 
of HIV/AIDS is of course difficult. This has not been our intention; rather it 
has been our aim to carefully examine what the Botswana conditions are for 
a successful implementation.  
3.4.1 Obstacles to implementation in the public sector 
One major institutional impediment to successful implementation of 
HIV/AIDS programmes has been identified; this is the reallocation of the 
workforce employed in the public sector. This section discusses 
implementation and the Botswana resource endowment concertedly because 
we have identified the lack of human resources in the public sector as the 
major obstacle to efficient implementation.     
Bengtsson describes a system where public sector employees are subject 
to involuntary reallocation, which she testifies has effects on efficiency in 
implementation. For example, as a nurse employed in the public sector you 
can, after education in Gaborone, be assigned to a very remote place in the 
country side with a contract stretching over a couple of years. When this 
contract has expired you are reassigned to some other, perhaps equally 
remote place. This assignment takes no consideration of family ties, of the 
employee’s own wishes, or the suitability of the employee for that particular 
location (Bengtsson 2006-12-01). 
Bengtsson reflects on how this structure of the public sector has two 
major effects on implementation in the public sector. Firstly, it leads to the 
public sector becoming a very unattractive employer for persons who have a 
choice to work somewhere else. Bengtsson herself says that this was the 
primary reason for her leaving the public sector. Secondly, due to the 
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massive turnover of public sector employees, a lack of sustainability, and 
more importantly, a lack of commitment to follow through an 
implementation process has become a problem. This system of reallocation 
has very little support among the public sector workforce. There is also a 
third factor that is not directly related to implementation facilitation, but 
nonetheless closely related to the pandemic. Decentralization with force 
does not only make people less motivated, but also parts families, which 
continue the spread of HIV/AIDS because it provides opportunity to have 
more than one partner (Bengtsson 2006-12-01).    
The ubiquity of donors in Botswana is problematic, because it does not 
only generate the positive outcome of a lot of aid but it also has the negative 
consequence that the educated workforce has the opportunity to find more 
beneficial employment with donors as employers, rather than in the less 
well paid public sector (Muchiru 2006-12-04). 
Drage emphasises the importance of strengthening the BHRIMS 
(Botswana HIV/AIDS Response Information Management System) and 
thinks that the bureaucracy could be downsized without making 
accountability and control suffer. Furthermore she questions the role of 
NACA as a coordinator and says that NACA has taken on implementation 
responsibilities which it is not supposed to do. (Drage 2006-12-07)  
3.4.2 Private sectors response to implementation 
Jallow states that there are naturally large difficulties to implementation 
within the private sector. The secretariat of BBCA consists of three people 
and its goal is to service 6000 businesses. Focus is put on helping smaller 
companies because they often lack the technical knowledge needed to deal 
with such a critical situation as the HIV/AIDS issue presents. BBCA only 
provides technical assistance, and performs advocacy and capacity building. 
Jallow adds that Botswana has gotten some of the basics right but 
implementation is difficult. She acknowledges the sense of corporate 
responsibility and the awareness of caring for the own community, because 
without this, there would not exist a pool to hire employees from. 
Companies have understood the importance of not only caring for the 
specific employee, but also for his or her family, and ARV is, in some 
cases, distributed to spouses and children (Jallow 2006-12-14).  
She also points to the possibilities for the private sector, and the 
individual company, to play an important role as a stakeholder. At the 
workplace people spend eight hours a day and it is a good place to spread 
information. Nonetheless, the cost-sharing between public and private 
sector is essential and ensures sustainable implementation. However, the 
costly programs are sometimes unaffordable for companies. Tax relieves 
for companies which develop AIDS-programs are being discussed, but no 
decision has of yet been taken (Jallow 2006-12-14).  
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The private sector’s response is also limited by foreign owned 
companies which do not have to follow Botswana policies, and which 
would probably leave if they were forced to. When the requirements on 
action become expensive and demanding they oppose the attempts to attract 
foreign investments. Jallow is hesitant on the issue of legislation. It is on 
one hand important and on the other it takes away the issue of will. 
Voluntarism has, according to her, created a natural source of social 
responsibility (Jallow 2006-12-14). Drage claims that the legislative 
environment in Botswana is weak and adds that a policy is something that 
does not have to be adhered to legally for an employer (Drage 2006-12-07). 
3.4.3 Civil society’s response to implementation 
Khan claims that the Botswana civil society is a weak one but hopes that it 
will grow stronger as the civil society and NGOs ought to be more occupied 
with implementation of the HIV/AIDS issues. She stresses that Botswana 
still is a developing country and that there is a limit to how much the 
government can pay for. But as long as health in general, and HIV/AIDS in 
particular, is such a politically sensitive issue it will be difficult to handle 
(Khan 2006-12-18). Jallow says that since the structure is in place, 
individuals have to have a certain element of self responsibility in this 
matter (Jallow 2006-12-14). 
Drage underlines how important it is to strengthen the civil society to 
reach the objectives with their HIV/AIDS programmes which usually have 
awareness and education as goals (Drage 2006-12-07) but several of the 
interviewees have also witnessed a fatigue of the HIV/AIDS awareness 
(Jallow 2006-12-14, Bengtsson 2006-12-01).  
Khan saw how, in the preparation of the establishment of NACA, the 
community needed to be mobilized. Even though the “fire” was put out by 
the roll-out of ARV, it was important to look at the causes of the “fire”, 
which derive from issues of gender, culture and socio-economic situations. 
The grass roots level need to be engaged, but it also needed support from 
the government to handle the task of action-taking. A practical solution to 
get the civil society engaged is to use traditional structures which people 
are familiar with, like the “kgotla”, and which are better than imported ones 
(Khan 2006-12-18). 
3.4.4 An example of the challenge of marrying policy and 
implementation  
Policy and implementation are closely linked together. An example of how 
difficult the introduction of a new policy can be is the Routine HIV Testing 
(RHT) Policy. It also presents the difficulties of proper action-taking in 
accordance to the new policies.  
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RHT is controversial, because it can be claimed to challenge a patient’s 
right to privacy and confidentiality. Disclosure of test results could lead to 
discrimination and stigmatisation, and it is of utmost importance that health 
care staff is educated on these topics. The National Policy on HIV/AIDS 
recognizes the importance of respecting human rights, but it also 
acknowledges the predicament of the right to confidentiality and the 
society’s right to protection from continued infections (“Healthcare Staff 
Knowledge and Attitudes toward Confidentiality of HIV Test Results in 
Botswana”, 2006 p vii f).  
A survey on knowledge about confidentiality of HIV test results within 
the health care staff was undertaken. It was conducted one year after 
introduction of the RHT and showed that more than one third of the health 
care staff was unaware or mistaken about the content of the National Policy 
on HIV/AIDS. 32. 7% of the interviewees reported that there were no copies 
of the policy or testing guidelines available at their site. 24. 2% did not 
know if there were any available at all (ibid p 10&14). 
The report concludes that the policy lacks clarity regarding 
confidentiality issues and that one interpretation of the finding of this is that 
the policy is not being implemented in its entirety, to all of the staff and 
updated to the staff when needed. However, knowledge of the policy does 
not necessarily mean compliance with it (ibid p vii,viii &17).  
If staff and civil society are not educated about the components of the 
National Policy on HIV/AIDS and the NSF they become irrelevant and 
implementation of its contents cease to exist. 
3.4.5 Operational challenges to efficient implementation 
There are several testimonies on how operational difficulties have hindered 
effective HIV/AIDS measures. Carolyn Wester, a Research Fellow at the 
Harvard Research Laboratory, explains how the roll-out of ARV treatment 
has been challenged by the operational difficulties which are due to bad 
infrastructural conditions in rural areas (Wester 2006-12-07). Aziz Haidari, 
the Information Technology Officer for the MASA-programme, provides an 
account of the great challenges he as the sole IT-officer had, when setting 
up the computer system to be able to efficiently keep track of the 
programme, and the patients enrolled. There were also great difficulties 
involved with creating a national database for the programme. The 
infrastructural challenge combined with lack of computer skills and also the 
lack of computers provided for a far from perfect roll-out of ARV (Haidari 
2006-11-27). 
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4. Analysis  
Our theoretical framework has given us the means to explore the current 
governance of the HIV/AIDS issue. The informants have provided us with 
the material needed to be able to analyse the situation and determine what 
might still be lacking in respect of governance. 
4.1 Reflections on policy 
Having stated that there is a clear political commitment to put a stop to the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic, we would like to elaborate on the fact that this has not 
been enough. The Botswana policy is the articulation of the multi-pronged, 
multi-sectoral and inclusive response, said to be needed. The consensus is 
clear; it is good enough. Conspicuous about the policy on HIV/AIDS is that 
the weaknesses, which are the most important as far as the policy goes, have 
to do with what the policy is lacking. The policy is formulated in accordance 
with the current law, and not in accordance with what would be the best and 
most effective response. This must surely be considered a substantial 
weakness. The example of condoms in prisons is in this respect very 
revealing, where there exists a distinguishable problem and a distinguishable 
solution, and where the legislation precludes the necessary linkage between 
these two. 
 If the existing laws are not formulated in a way that facilitates following 
a policy, then it is imperative that the policy becomes the basis for 
formulation of laws. However, due to the weak legislative environment in 
Botswana this has not been the case. Instead the policy has come to be 
regarded as a recommendation and as an advice.  
 It is our impression that the private sector as a whole is not an engaged 
stakeholder. The understanding that “it makes business sense to care about 
HIV/AIDS” is not easily achieved. We argue that it is likely that the private 
sector will not actively be involved in the fight against HIV/AIDS without 
forcing legislation. For the individual company, the short-term economical 
burden is perceived as larger than the unforeseeable economical benefits to 
the whole private sector of coming to terms with this pandemic. The lack of 
forcing legislation has thus weakened the policy stage of governance of the 
HIV/AIDS issue. 
In the context of policy the Botswana civil society seems well aligned 
with the multisectoral approach to the issue, but the civil society should be 
more involved in the process of policy formulation. This, to ensure a more 
effective trickle-down process from the highest tiers of society to grass root 
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level, where a lot of change still needs to take place and plenty of forces 
need to be mobilised. It is difficult to change a pattern of a top-down, and 
hierarchical structure, but measures should be taken to include the civil 
society, since it would give the people ownership of the HIV/AIDS issue.    
It is obvious policy is not enough as a starting point for dealing with an 
issue of the urgency that the HIV/AIDS pandemic presents. Throughout this 
dissertation we have described the response and the measures taken to 
impede the spread of the HIV/AIDS epidemic as a “fight”. This euphemism 
is a just one, because it helps portray the willingness of the stakeholders. 
But if policy is merely regarded to be of advisory character it seems a poor 
instrument with which to win a fight. 
Some issues will find the perfect starting point in an advisory policy. 
Proper resource allocation and effective implementation would then be 
consequences of a policy of that character. But issues which are considered 
as worthy of fights need to be approached more ruthlessly than the way that 
the Botswana HIV/AIDS issue is being approached at the moment. 
4.4 Enough resources? 
In our discussion of resources focus is put on the public sector, which to a 
greater extent than the civil society and the private sector can allocate 
resources.  
Our theoretical division between financial and human resources has 
proven useful as the interviewees’ answers have showed clear differences in 
quandary localisation. Lack of financial resources is always a problem and 
there might never be such a thing as “enough” resources, as Bengtsson 
remarks. There is still consensus that the problems with implementation do 
not depend on insufficient financial resources. Nonetheless there are 
financial barriers to overcome. One of them is NACA’s structures and 
methods which have lead to lost funding and difficulties to get money 
through to civil society. In the future, the sustainability of expensive 
HIV/AIDS related programmes must be dealt with.  
The concerns regarding the costs of the ARV treatment and other 
HIV/AIDS programmes are profound and legitimate, and stopped 
programmes would result in a humanitarian catastrophe. Since the financial 
resources at the moment are not running out, the more acute problem is the 
lack in human resources, and represents a reason why the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic is such an unmanageable problem. All levels fail to satisfactorily 
implement the policies and goals, much due to the lack of human capacity. 
There are not nearly enough skilled personnel in Botswana to deal with the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic, and the country is educationally ill-equipped. The 
new medical school might solve some of the human capacity problems 
within the health sector, but it takes time to educate doctors and nurses and 
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time must be considered a scarce resource. Human capacity needs to be 
strengthened as multisectorally as the issue is considered to be.  
It is definitely worrying that the NGOs, which work on grass roots level 
and have the clearest sense of what is needed at that level, are so dependent 
on the state and external donors that resources are not put to the best use. A 
stronger civil society and a private sector that understands the value of 
releasing resources to fight HIV/AIDS is vital.  
The risk that foreign owned companies would be deterred from investing 
in Botswana, if they were faced with harsher legislation, is a conundrum. 
Still, harsher legislation is what is needed in regard to the whole private 
sector. To regard this reasoning as dissuasive to foreign investment at 
present would disregard the outcome a stronger legislative environment, 
could have, for the future. The effects this will have on the economy, and 
what sacrifices it would entail has to be put into the context. Nonetheless, it 
would ensure that Botswana will continue to be a good place to invest in, 
even further on. Even so, if there is any area that the concept of corporate 
responsibility should start to cross borders, it is the HIV/AIDS issue in Sub-
Saharan Africa.         
      4.4 The constraints to effective implementation 
Even though implementation has been discussed as a separate element of 
governance, it is more correct to consider it the last stage of a process. This 
stage requires forceful policy formulations and access to plentiful resources. 
When informants identify implementation as the weakest link in the system 
we consider this to be a consequence of failure not only at this stage, but 
also on the part of either policy or resources, or both. What has not been 
implemented properly, or at all, depends on what is not yet there, within the 
policy and resource elements. Still, it will prove useful to elaborate on 
implementation in its own right since it has been identified as the most 
difficult part of making governance effective. 
Two main obstacles can be recognized. Firstly, the task of measuring 
such an element as implementation provides a difficult starting point. 
Compared to policy and resources, both which are definite and measurable, 
implementation provides an abstract element which strengths and 
weaknesses are hard to assess. There are few means for comparison 
between earlier programmes and existing ones since the situation of 
HIV/AIDS in Botswana is a very dynamic one, where the conditions for 
success and failure of a programme are constantly challenged.  
Secondly, the time gap between policy formulation, implementation and 
measurable results and outcomes are preventing correct evaluation. This gap 
is very large, and is troublesome because it misguides external spectators. 
The outcomes of implementation efforts are not immediately clear and hard 
to assess. It is possible that the HIV/AIDS pandemic has reached a breaking 
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point, which is how the small decline in incidence numbers could be 
analyzed. This suggests that implementation efforts for some time have 
been more successful than its assessment shows.  
The most efficient use the public sector could have of civil society, at the 
implementation stage, is if it were to act as one coherent body. This is not 
the case, nor will it ever be because NGOs exists because of a need which 
has been observed at grass root level. These heterogeneous needs are 
sometimes perceived as counterproductive to an efficient response. 
Nonetheless they aid the governance of the issue in a way that does not 
necessarily provide for the clear-cut way forward, but homogeneity is not 
always feasible to strive for at grass root level. 
In comparison to what we above described as a scattered civil society, 
the private sector is even more fragmented. The private sector does not have 
the containment of the HIV/AIDS pandemic as its primary purpose (as the 
civil society at least in theory has). This has consequences for the private 
sector as an implementer. The realisation of programmes within the private 
sector is dependent on the fact that where there is a will there is a way. The 
dependence on good-will has led to ad hoc solutions to immediate 
problems, without a sustainable direction. It would be naïve to count on the 
employers’ sense of community responsibility, and the non-involvement of 
the private sector has weakened the governance of the HIV/AIDS issue. The 
BBCA, which works to facilitate the private sector’s response, is too small 
to carry out this task. Also, legislation and policies that are optional to 
companies are doomed to complicate and obfuscate effective 
implementation.     
The coordination of the public sector is better and does not pose such a 
threat to efficiency, even though the confusion over the role of NACA has 
been identified as an obstacle to implementation. Instead, the lack of skills 
is an impediment, due to the system of involuntary reallocation. When the 
most capable and competent employees leave for workplaces with more 
attractive working conditions this will inadvertently have a “brain drain” 
affect on the public sector. This exacerbates the problem of scarcity of 
human capacity discussed earlier. It is essential to have well motivated and 
skilled workforce to executed implementation, be it in the private sector, the 
public sector or in the civil society. This system significantly weakens the 
effectiveness of the response, because it impedes a sustainable 
implementation, worsens the problem of “brain drain” and indirectly causes 
people to become infected.               
 Civil society needs to be strengthened at the implementation stage as 
well, and a fine balance between educating the public and the potential 
threat “awareness fatigue” might have on effective implementation has to be 
found.                     
 Lastly, it is unavoidable to discuss the success and failures of 
implementation efforts from a governance point of view without 
acknowledging the fact that governance is only as good as the individuals it 
manages to change the behaviour of. The effectiveness of the governance of 
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the HIV/AIDS issue will in the end be determined by the will of the 
individual to be affected by the concerted efforts made possible by 
functioning policy, resources and implementation. 
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5. Conclusion  
We have found that in terms of the governance of the HIV/AIDS issue, 
Botswana has come a long way. It is clear that the response to the 
HIV/AIDS situation in Botswana is incapacitated in all the studied elements 
of governance.  
Policy cannot be formulated as strongly as the situation requires, because 
current legislation does not allow for the necessary pragmatism. The fact 
that the legislative environment in Botswana in general is weak has the 
consequence that this, already far from perfect, policy only becomes 
advisory, which renders it less likely to have an impact. This is troublesome 
because policy formulated without the pressure to reform existing flaws in 
the system will not generate any new solutions to neither the legal 
framework nor to the response to the issue.  
The human capacity constraints is a great hindrance both as it affects the 
ability to take the existing financial resources into use and also because it 
poses great threats to effectiveness at the implementation stage.   
Implementation needs to be both more sustainable in the long run, and 
effective in the short run. There are structural changes that would ease some 
of the difficulties identified. Still, if working policy and resource elements 
are not in place to ensure implementation, then little will be achieved by 
making changes within this stage.  
What further has come to our attention is the fact that even though 
everyone might consider themselves to be affected by this situation, it is 
important that stakeholders do in fact embrace the responsibility that comes 
with holding stakes. The civil society needs to find a way to organise itself 
to become a stronger actor. The private sector needs to understand the 
importance of taking action in this matter and become more involved. Both 
the civil society and the private sector need to take, and be allowed to take, 
a greater part in the formulation of policy.  
The weaknesses of the governance of HIV/AIDS are destructive to the 
containment of the pandemic and the lack of academic focus on this topic 
must also be considered to have its consequences. The gained knowledge 
should form a foundation on which one must continue to develop 
constructive theory and pragmatic thinking to come to terms with the 
situation, and to bring about better governance.  
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7. Appendix 
7.1 Appendix 1: Objectives of the National 
Strategic Framework 
 
• Increase the number of persons within the sexually active population 
(especially those aged 15–24) who adopt HIV prevention behaviors in 
Botswana by 2009. 
• Decrease HIV transmission from HIV-positive mothers to their newborns 
by 2009. 
• Decrease the prevalence of HIV in transfused blood in the country. 
• Increase the level of productivity of people living with HIV/AIDS, 
especially 
those on antiretroviral therapy. 
• Decrease the incidence of tuberculosis among HIV-positive patients in the 
country. 
• Broaden the skills of health workers (doctors and nurses) to accurately 
diagnose and treat opportunistic infections. 
• Ensure the implementation of the NSF Minimum HIV/AIDS Response 
Packages by all sectors, ministries, districts, and state enterprises. 
• Ensure the full implementation of all planned HIV/AIDS activities at all 
levels. 
• Minimize the impact of the epidemic on the persons infected, those 
otherwise 
affected, public services, and the economy. 
• Create a supportive, ethical, legal, and human rights-based environment 
conforming to international standards for the implementation of the 
National Response. 
 
 
Taken from box 9.1 i An Economical Assessment of the National Strategic 
Framework by Iyabo Masha, 2007-05-18, 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/AIDS/eng/chapter9.pdf 
 
 
 
 
